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Introduction 
In the last decade, the average public health expenditures per capita in OECD countries increased by 
76 per cent (OECD, 2012). This increase is a serious threat to the fiscal sustainability of health-care 
spending and therefore of great concern to policymakers in many countries. One of the drivers of 
health-care expenditures is moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to the change in health behaviour and 
health-care consumption caused by the fact that the insurance reimburses the costs (Zweifel and 
Manning, 2000). To counteract moral hazard, the German, Dutch and Swiss basic health insurance 
schemes include the option of a voluntary deductible. A voluntary deductible implies that people can 
choose to pay their health-care expenses up to a certain amount out-of-pocket in return for a premium 
rebate. In these countries however, the premium rebate—and thereby the attractiveness of voluntary 
deductibles—is reduced by the risk equalisation scheme. In this article, saving for health care in 
combination with a voluntary deductible is proposed as an interesting option to increase the 
attractiveness of voluntary deductibles in these schemes. 
The effect of risk equalisation on premium rebates 
The insurer is able to provide a premium rebate to enrollees who opt for a voluntary deductible because 
these enrollees on average have lower insurance claims than enrollees without a voluntary deductible. 
This difference in insurance claims, and therefore the premium rebate, consists of three components. 
(Van Kleef et al., 2008). The first component consists of the expected out-of-pocket expenditures paid 
by the enrollee. Since the enrollee pays health-care expenditures up to the deductible amount out-of-
pocket, the insurer has to reimburse less compared to an insurance plan without a voluntary deductible. 
The second component consists of the reduction in moral hazard due to the voluntary deductible. Van 
Kleef et al. (2008) have indicated the size of this moral hazard reduction within the Swiss basic health 
insurance scheme. They found that a voluntary deductible of 45 per cent of the average expected 
health-care expenses of the group of enrollees who opted for that deductible level, resulted in a moral 
hazard reduction of about 13 per cent relative to the average expected health-care expenses of that 
group. The third component of the premium rebate is the effect of self-selection. Self-selection occurs 
because, given a certain premium rebate, the healthy insured have a greater incentive to opt for a 
voluntary deductible than the unhealthy insured. Self-selection results in market segmentation in a way 
that enrollees who opt for a voluntary deductible are, on average, healthier, have lower total 
expenditures—and thus lower insurance claims—than enrollees who do not opt for a voluntary 
deductible. Van Kleef et al. (2008) indicate the size of the three components mentioned above (see 
table 1). In a competitive health insurance market, insurers will reflect these components in the 
premium rebate for a voluntary deductible (Van Kleef et al., 2008).  
                                               
  All authors are from the Department of Health Insurance, Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
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Table 1. Three components of the potential premium rebate in case of a voluntary deductible of 
CHF1270 per year.
1
 
 
 Potential premium rebate (without risk equalisation) 
Out-of-pocket expenses CHF432 
Moral hazard reduction  CHF318 
Self-selection effect CHF2,439 
Total CHF3,189 
 
However, in the presence of risk equalisation the self-selection component—and therefore the potential 
premium rebate—will be smaller. Risk equalisation compensates insurers for differences in expected 
expenses between low-risk individuals and high-risk individuals. If risk equalisation were to perfectly 
adjust for differences in expected expenses, the effect of self-selection on the premium rebate would be 
zero. In that case, the premium rebate could only consist of the expected out-of-pocket expenditure and 
the reduction in moral hazard. The study by Van Kleef et al. (2008) shows that a risk equalisation model 
based on age/gender, pharmacy-based cost groups and diagnostic cost groups, reduces the self-
selection component in Table 1 to CHF630. 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland  
Cost sharing 
As mentioned in the introduction, the German, Dutch and Swiss basic health insurance schemes 
include the option of a voluntary deductible. Since 2009, different mandatory cost-sharing arrangements 
are in place in Germany. Enrollees have to pay a €10 copayment per day for hospital care and post-
hospital rehabilitation, with a limit of 28 days per year per individual. Next to this, they have to pay a €10 
copayment per quarter for the first visit to the physician, the first visit to the dentist and for each contact 
with other physicians seen without referral and a €10 copayment per day for outpatient rehabilitation 
services during that quarter. Finally, enrollees pay a 10 per cent coinsurance rate for non-physician 
care, eye care, hearing aids, orthopaedics, transportation and prescription drugs, with a minimum of €5 
and a maximum of €10. Enrollees up to the age of 18 and pregnant women are exempted from these 
mandatory cost-sharing arrangements. The annual limit on mandatory cost sharing for non chronically 
ill and for chronically ill is, respectively, 2 and 1 per cent of annual assessed gross disposable income. 
On top of these mandatory arrangements, enrollees may opt for a voluntary deductible, which is 
maximised by the enrollee’s income. The German insurer is free in setting the income thresholds and 
the corresponding deductible level. However, no data is yet available on the percentage of enrollees 
who opt for a voluntary deductible and on the associated premium rebates offered by insurers.  
Since 2006, all Dutch residents aged 18 years and older have a mandatory deductible of €350 (2013) 
per individual per year. On top of the mandatory deductible, enrollees may opt for one of five voluntary 
deductible levels; €100, €200, €300, €400 or €500. The premium rebate the insured receives has to be 
the same for each enrollee with the same deductible level and the same health insurance product. The 
premium rebate for the highest deductible level varies among insurers from €180 to €288 (respectively 
36 and 58 per cent of the deductible amount). The percentage of enrollees who opt for a voluntary 
deductible has increased from 5 per cent in 2006 to 7 per cent in 2012 (Smit and Mokveld,, 2006; ten 
Hove, 2012).  
Swiss residents aged 18 years and older are obliged to pay a mandatory deductible of €2502 (2013) per 
individual per year. On top of the mandatory deductible, they may opt for one of five voluntary 
deductible levels; €165, €580, €995, €1,405 or €1,820. In addition, they are obliged to pay 10 per cent 
                                               
1
  Average insurance-reimbursed costs for enrollees with a voluntary deductible of CHF1,270 (i.e. 13 per cent of total 
enrollees) were CHF489, and CHF3,678. for enrollees with only a mandatory deductible of CHF230 (i.e. 53 per cent 
of total enrollees).  
2
  Swiss francs are throughout the rest of the article converted to euros using an exchange rate of 1CHF = €0,8277 (1 
January 2013).  
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of the health-care expenses exceeding the total deductible (with a maximum of €580). Children in 
Switzerland also have the opportunity to opt for a voluntary deductible, but with lower levels and they 
have to pay 10 percent of the health-care expenses exceeding the voluntary deductible (with a 
maximum of €290). The Swiss government has capped the premium rebate at 70 per cent of the 
additional deductible level (e.g. €1,275 for the highest deductible level). All Swiss insurers offer their 
insureds this maximum premium rebate (for each deductible level). In Switzerland the percentage of 
enrollees (including both adults and children) who opt for a voluntary deductible has been steady over 
the past five years, namely about 46 per cent (Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 2013).  
These findings show that the premium rebates for voluntary deductibles (and the percentage of 
enrollees opting for a deductible) are substantially higher in Switzerland than in the Netherlands. The 
explanation for this difference is to be found in the (difference in) the quality of the risk equalisation 
scheme in these countries.  
Risk equalisation 
Since 2009, the German risk equalisation formula has been based on age, gender, occupational 
disability, and morbidity. Since 2012, The Dutch risk equalisation formula has been based on age, 
gender, region, source of income, socioeconomic status, pharmacy-based cost group, diagnostic cost 
group and multiple-year high costs. The Swiss risk equalisation formula has since 2012 been based on 
age, gender and prior hospitalisation (i.e. inpatient stay of four days or longer). Since the risk 
equalisation model is of higher quality in the Netherlands than in Switzerland, it is expected that the 
premium rebate be indeed smaller in the Netherlands, as is observed. However, because predictable 
profits and losses for insurers on the subgroup level still remain, risk equalisation in all three countries 
will undergo further improvements in the upcoming years. Consequently, the effect of self-selection on 
the premium rebate will reduce and the premium rebate itself will decrease. This will make opting for a 
voluntary deductible less attractive than it is today. Nevertheless, it may be important that (more) 
enrollees opt for a voluntary deductible since this would reduce moral hazard and contribute to the 
control of public health-care expenditures. The following paragraph provides an interesting option to 
increase the attractiveness of voluntary deductibles in these schemes. 
Saving for health care  
Known as Health Savings Accounts (HSA), saving for health care is increasingly popular in America 
and other countries such as Singapore, South Africa and China (Hurley and Guindon, 2008). An HSA 
consists of a high-deductible health plan combined with a savings account that may be used to pay for 
expenses under the deductible. The enrollee receives interest on the account balance and, under 
certain conditions, does not have to pay taxes on the contributions to the savings account. Since the 
enrollee is the owner of the savings account, the account can be transferred when the enrollee switches 
employer or insurer. Saving for health care in combination with a voluntary deductible could also be 
introduced in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland to make opting for a voluntary deductible 
more attractive. The idea is to combine the voluntary deductible with a savings account upon which the 
premium rebate is deposited. The account balance is then used to pay for out-of-pocket expenses due 
to the voluntary deductible. The financing of the savings account may be designed as presented in 
Table 2, where a Swiss enrollee has opted for a voluntary deductible of €1,820. The premium rebate of 
€1,275 is deposited on the savings account (column 2). During, for example, five years, the enrollee 
saves a maximum of €6,375 (column 3). If, in the first year, the enrollee is confronted with €730 in out-
of-pocket expenses due to the deductible (column 4), this will be paid from the savings account. At the 
end of the first calendar year, the enrollee will then have an account balance of €545 (column 5). For 
the coming years this will continue in the same way.  
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Table 2. Example of saving for health care in combination with a voluntary deductible of €1820 
per year in Switzerland.  
 
 Premium 
rebate 
Total premium 
rebate on 
savings account 
Health-care 
expenses under the 
voluntary 
deductible  
Account balance at 
the end of the 
calendar year 
Year 1 €1,275 €1,275 €730 €545 
Year 2 €1,275 €2,550 €365 €1,455 
Year 3 €1,275 €3,825 €1,820 €910 
Year 4 €1,275 €5,100 €0 €2,185 
Year 5 €1,275 €6,375 €730 €2,730 
 
Introducing saving for health care in combination with a voluntary deductible can increase the 
attractiveness of voluntary deductibles because of three reasons. First, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
have done extensive research on decisions under risk in which they developed the prospect theory. In 
this theory it is assumed that individuals treat outcomes as deviations (i.e. gains and losses) from a 
reference point and are more sensitive to losses than to gains at the same magnitude. The latter is 
called loss aversion. Saving for health care in combination with a voluntary deductible could change the 
enrollees’ reference point when deciding to opt for a voluntary deductible. Without saving for health 
care, the enrollee has to pay for all health-care expenses under the voluntary deductible out-of-pocket. 
With saving for health care, the enrollee is (partly) prepared for these expenses because of his savings 
account. This could positively influence the reference point and increase, ceteris paribus, the 
attractiveness of voluntary deductibles. Second, the perceived loss aversion could be reduced due to 
saving for health care. Since, in the case of saving for health care, opting for a voluntary deductible is 
combined with a savings account, the perceived loss is reduced to the difference between the voluntary 
deductible level and the premium rebate. In upcoming years, the perceived loss could even be reduced 
to zero because the savings could exceed the deductible level. Third, enrollees could be afraid of 
incurring liquidity problems when opting for a voluntary deductible. Liquidity problems occur when the 
enrollee receives an invoice to pay the voluntary deductible, but is at that moment not able to pay the 
bill. Extensive literature on saving underlines that people have self-control problems (Katona, 1975). 
This means that individuals find it difficult not to spend their money on other purposes (Nyhus and 
Webley, 2006). Saving for health care can mitigate this lack of self-control and, ceteris paribus, reduce 
the risk of incurring liquidity problems. Consequently, the attractiveness of voluntary deductibles could 
be increased. 
Conclusion  
Health-care expenses are, among others, driven by moral hazard, which results from having 
(comprehensive) health insurance. Providing enrollees with the option of a voluntary deductible is one 
of the instruments governments have to counteract moral hazard. However, in the German, Dutch and 
Swiss basic health insurance schemes, the benefit from opting for a voluntary deductible (i.e. the 
premium rebate) is reduced due to (improvements of) risk equalisation. To increase the attractiveness 
of voluntary deductibles, saving for health care in combination with a voluntary deductible could be 
introduced. In that case, the voluntary deductible is combined with a savings account upon which the 
premium rebate is deposited and can then be used to pay for health-care expenses under the voluntary 
deductible. Consequently, the attractiveness of voluntary deductibles is increased and more enrollees 
than today could be inclined to opt for a voluntary deductible. This would reduce moral hazard and 
contributes to the control of health-care expenses. Therefore, further research on the optimal design of 
saving for health care and its potential effects is necessary. 
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